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ABSTRACT
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (“GERD”), a $4.7 billion
construction expected to produce 6,000 megawatts of power, will be the
largest hydropower dam in Africa and the tenth largest in the world. The dam
will feed electricity into the grids of Ethiopia and its neighboring countries,
providing vast economic advantages for the region. At the same time, riparian
states downstream from the Nile River, especially water-dependent Egypt,
fear a threat to their freshwater resources and are heavily opposed to the
building and future operation of the dam. As the legality of the project has
been challenged by Egypt and others, the question arises whether the GERD
violates international law. This question is answered by analyzing existing
international agreements and customary international law. This Article
concludes that the GERD is not in violation as long as negotiations between
the parties at stake are maintained, and Ethiopia exercises due diligence in
preventing the imposition of significant transboundary harm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
And the waters of the sea will be dried up, and the river will be
dry and parched, and its canals will become foul, and the
branches of Egypt's Nile will diminish and dry up, reeds and
rushes will rot away. There will be bare places by the Nile, on the
brink of the Nile, and all that is sown by the Nile will be parched,
will be driven away, and will be no more. The fishermen will
mourn and lament, all who cast a hook in the Nile; and they will
languish who spread nets on the water.1
Almost 3,000 years ago, a devastating prophecy was proclaimed
revealing the future of the Nile River in Egypt. Considering the predicted
consequences of the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (“GERD”) today, fear that this biblical prediction will
soon come to fruition seems more realistic than ever. The GERD, which
began construction in 20112 at a cost of $4.7 billion and is expected to
produce 6,000 megawatts of power,3 will be the largest hydropower dam
in all of Africa and the tenth largest in the world.4 Additionally, it will
provide electricity to Ethiopia and its neighboring countries, which is
expected to result in vast economic advantages for the region.5 The dam is

Copyright 2022, by RICARDA E. VON MEDING.
 Ricarda E. von Meding is a German lawyer with a specialization in
environmental and energy law. She holds a German law degree and an LL.M.
from Tulane Law School. Ricarda’s prior work includes research on African,
International, and Administrative law at the University of Passau, Germany. The
author would like to thank Professor Kim Talus and David Ivy-Taylor, J. D. Cand.
at Tulane Law School for their insights and comments on the article. Email:
ricardavonmeding@gmail.com.
1. Isaiah 19:5–8 (ESV) (emphasis added).
2. Security Council Press Release SC/14232: Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam Agreement Within Reach, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council,
as Trilateral Talks Proceed to Settle Remaining Differences, UNITED NATIONS
(June 29, 2020), https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14232.doc.htm [https://per
ma.cc/2TFT-X5TR].
3. Egyptian Warning over Ethiopia Nile Dam, BBC (June 10, 2013), https:
//www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22850124 [https://perma.cc/76AF-FB49].
4. Salman M. A. Salman, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The
Road to the Declaration of Principles and the Khartoum Document, 41 WATER
INT’L 512, 516 (2016).
5. See Mahemud Eshtu Tekuya, Sink or Swim: Alternatives for Unlocking
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Dispute, 59 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 65,
68 (2020).
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located on the Blue Nile River, a tributary stream of the Nile, and draws
from the Nile River’s basin area, which covers 11 African countries before
entering the Mediterranean Sea in Egypt.6 Egypt, the riparian7 furthest
downstream, is heavily dependent on the Blue Nile, with 85–90% of the
nation’s freshwater coming from the river.8 The construction of the dam
potentially threatens freshwater resources in Egypt—a danger with serious
consequences.

Figure 1: The Nile River Basin indicating the location of the GERD9

6. The Nile-riparian states are Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Uganda, Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi.
7. A riparian state is “located on the bank of a natural watercourse (such as
a river).” Riparian, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/riparian [https://perma.cc/QTW8-QZK9] (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
8. Compare Mahemud Eshtu Tekuya, The Egyptian Hydro-Hegemony in the
Nile Basin: The Quest for Changing the Status Quo, 26 J. WATER L. 10, 10 n.2
(2020) (“Ethiopia contributes 86% of the water reaching Egypt . . . .”), with THE
WATER RESOURCES OF THE NILE BASIN, THE STATE OF THE RIVER NILE BASIN 36
(2012) (mentioning 85–90% comes from the “Eastern Nile sub-system” which
encompasses the Blue Nile).
9. Nile, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nile#/media/File:River_
Nile_map.svg [https://perma.cc/8HRX-BLFD] (last visited Sept. 26, 2021)
(Graph altered with a marker to depict the location of the GERD).
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As a vital freshwater resource in a mostly arid region, disputes over
the Nile River’s water have long existed. Addressing Ethiopia’s thenexisting plan to build a dam, former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
stated in 1978 that “[w]e depend upon the Nile 100[%] in our life, so if
anyone, at any moment, thinks to deprive us of our life we shall never
hesitate to go to war because it is a matter of life or death,”10 and in 1979
that “[t]he only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”11 In
2013, after Ethiopia began diverting water for the GERD’s erection, thenPresident Mohammed Morsi threatened “if [the Nile River water]
diminishes by one drop then our blood is the alternative.”12 After the
Ethiopian cybersecurity agency reported that Egyptian individuals carried
out cyberattacks on Ethiopian official websites in 2020 to impair the
building of the GERD by weakening Ethiopia’s infrastructure,13 some
authors argued that a war over the water had already begun.14 With
Ethiopia and Egypt insisting on their respective positions, the question
arises as to whether the filling and operation of the GERD constitutes a
violation of international law. This Article answers that question by
evaluating specific international law governing the Nile River Basin and
general international water law. The analysis begins with an evaluation of
the applicable law, followed by an analysis of the procedural and
substantive obligations under such applicable law, and then concludes
with whether the GERD violates international law. This Article does not
analyze whether the past erection of the GERD constituted a violation, as
current disputes focus solely on the way forward—how and when the dam
reservoir may be filled and operated.

10. Christopher L. Kukk & David A. Deese, At the Water’s Edge--Regional
Conflict and Cooperation over Fresh Water, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
21, 46 (1996).
11. Niveen Tadros, Shrinking Water Resources: The National Security Issue
of This Century, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1091, 1091 (1997).
12. Egyptian Warning over Ethiopia Nile Dam, supra note 3.
13. See Information Network Security Agency, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/INSA.ETHIOPIA/photos/a.406907239409122/2716
831498416673/?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/Q8YM-GLZJ].
14. See Ayenat Mersie, The Ethiopian-Egyptian Water War Has Begun,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 22, 2020, 6:41 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/22
/the-ethiopian-egyptian-water-war-has-begun/ [https://perma.cc/4E5N-CFZE];
see also Tekuya, supra note 5, at 65 (describing “a war of words and accusations”).
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II. APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
A. The Nile’s Regulatory Framework
With a length of 6,650 kilometers,15 the Nile River is the world’s
longest river16 and flows through a region that has seen significant political
change throughout its past. Consequently, the river basin has been bound
by various regional agreements. As it is disputed which of these
agreements are currently binding upon the riparian states, an overview of
the (potentially) applicable law is provided in the following sections.
1. Colonial and Early Post-Colonial Agreements
The first steps toward international regulation of the Nile’s waters
were taken in the late 19th century when a vast majority of the Nile Basin
was still colonized.17 Various agreements on the Nile River were finalized
by the United Kingdom, the main local colonial power of today’s
sovereign African states. An early agreement between Great Britain and
Ethiopia dating back to 1902 provided the British colonists great influence
over the Nile’s water.18 This agreement barred Ethiopia from constructing
any works across the Nile tributaries that “would arrest the flow of their
waters except into the Nile in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s
Government and the Government of the Soudan.”19

15. Tekuya, supra note 8, at 10 n.2.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Arthur Okoth-Owiro, The Nile Treaty: State Succession and International
Treaty Commitments: A Case Study of the Nile Water Treaties, in 9 OCCASIONAL
PAPERS EAST AFRICA 6–7 (Konrad Adenauer Foundation ed., 2004); Christina M.
Carroll, Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin, 12 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 269, 276–79 (1999). Ethiopia is the only country in the region
that was never colonized; it was only occupied by Italy between 1936 and 1941.
Aaron Tesfaye, The Politics of the Imposed and Negotiation of the Emerging Nile
Basin Regime, 7 INT’L J. ETH. STUD. 57, 62 (2013).
18. See Treaties Relative to the Frontiers Between the Soudan, Ethiopia and
Eritrea, Eth.-U.K., May 15, 1902, [1902] U.K.T.S. 16 [hereinafter 1902
Agreement]. All regional treaties can be viewed at African River Basins, INT’L
WATER PROJECT, https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/document[s/africa.html
#Nile%20River%20Basin [https://perma.cc/2T37-WT68] (last visited Oct. 18,
2021).
19. 1902 Agreement, supra note 18, art. III; see Kristin Wiebe, The Nile
River: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation in the Face of Water Degradation,
41 NAT. RES. J. 731, 746 (2001).
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In 192920 and 1959,21 two more regional agreements followed. The
1929 Agreement was negotiated between Egypt and the British colonists
on behalf of Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika (today: Tanzania).22
In the 1929 Agreement, the river water was allocated based on Egypt and
Sudan’s respective needs,23 further reaffirming that works on the river
could not be constructed that 1) either reduce the quantities of water
arriving in Egypt or modify the date of its arrival, or 2) lower its level.24
The 1959 Agreement was entered into by Sudan and the United Arab
Republic.25 According to that Agreement, Egypt was allocated a
guaranteed 55.5 billion cubic meters of water annually, whereas Sudan
was promised a share of 18.5 billion cubic meters.26
Both Agreements disregarded the needs of the other riparian states,
despite the majority of the Nile’s water flowing from Ethiopia. From
today’s perspective, subjecting the erection of a river project to another
state’s consent is not a general principle of law or customary law,27 as this
would conflict with state sovereignty.

20. Exchange of Notes Regarding the Use of the Waters of the Nile for
Irrigation Purposes, Egypt-U.K., May 7, 1929, [1929] U.K.T.S. 17 [hereinafter
1929 Agreement]; see also Okoth-Owiro, supra note 17, at 7–8; Carroll, supra
note 17, at 276–80.
21. Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Egypt-Sudan, Nov. 8,
1959, 453 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter 1959 Agreement]. One reason for the 1959
Agreement was the fact that Sudan, after becoming independent in 1956, did not
consider itself bound to the 1929 Agreement. See Okoth-Owiro, supra note 17, at 13.
22. Okoth-Owiro, supra note 17, at 7.
23. Aaron T. Wolf, Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation, 32 ANN. REV.
ENV’T. RES. 241, 249 (2007).
24. See 1929 Agreement, supra note 20; Ryan B. Stoa, The United Nations
Watercourses Convention on the Dawn of Entry into Force, 47 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1321, 1355 (2014).
25. See 1959 Agreement, supra note 21. At the time of the 1959 Agreement,
Egypt was a part of the United Arab Republic.
26. See id.
27. See Lake Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Arb. Trib. 1957), 24
I.L.R. 101, para 13 [hereinafter Lake Lanoux Arb.] (“[T]he rule that States may
utilize the hydraulic power of international watercourses only on condition of a
prior agreement between the interested States cannot be established as a custom,
even less as a general principle of law . . . . Customary international law . . . does
not . . . permit us to conclude that there exists a general principle of law or a
custom to this effect.”).
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2. The Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework
and Its Legal Implications
a. Emergence of the Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative
Framework
Several decades later, the Nile Basin countries convened to renegotiate
the use and management of the Nile River. The negotiations resulted in the
Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (“CFA”), also
referred to as the Entebbe Agreement, in May 2010.28 As it currently
stands, the CFA is signed by Ethiopia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya,
and Burundi and ratified by Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda.29
In order for the CFA to have the effect of law, six ratifications or
accessions are needed,30 meaning the Agreement is currently two states
short of the requisite amount.
Due to disputes over the precise wording of Article 14(b) of the CFA,
which regulates water security, Egypt and Sudan refused to enter into the
Agreement.31 The two countries view that section as a threat to their
previously agreed-upon shares of water and the need for Egypt’s consent
prior to constructions on the tributary streams as laid out in the
Agreements of 1902, 1929, and 1959.
b. Implications of Earlier Agreements
If the earlier Agreements are binding upon the other riparian states,
Egypt would have a right to the majority of Nile water and a veto power
over projects such as the GERD.32 To substantiate this view, Egypt relies
on the fact that the old Agreements remain in place until they are replaced
by a new agreement of all parties—a legal concept referred to as the

28. Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework, opened for
signature May 14, 2010 [hereinafter CFA].
29. See Cooperative Framework Agreement, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, https://
nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73&Itemid=87
&lang= [https://perma.cc/29DV-SBAP] (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
30. CFA, supra note 28, art. 42.
31. The current version of Article 14(b) of the CFA provides that states are
“not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State.” Id.
annex, art. 14(b) (emphasis omitted). Egypt and Sudan disagreed with this,
proposing instead that the wording should state “not to adversely affect the water
security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State.” See id.
(emphasis omitted).
32. Wolf, supra note 23, at 249.
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“historical use doctrine.”33 Alternatively, the argument could be made in
favor of Egypt that the 1929 Agreement is still in force because of its
territorial implications which “necessitate its respect by successor
states.”34 Underlying this is the idea that the scope of the old Agreements
is regionally limited to the Nile territory, and that it should therefore be
binding on whichever state’s territory falls within this scope.35
To the contrary, all other riparian states rely on the “clean slate
doctrine,”36 also referred to as the “Nyerere Doctrine” in the local context
of the Nile.37 The doctrine provides that treaties entered into by the
colonial powers are not binding on their successors regarding treaty
obligations if the successor states decide not to accept such obligations.38
However, this argument would not work in Ethiopia’s favor in regard to
the 1902 Agreement as Ethiopia was never colonized. An additional
argument against the current applicability of colonial Agreements is that
Great Britain concluded inheritance treaties with some of its former
colonies, which is not the case with the Nile-riparian states that were
formerly British colonies.39 In the case of an inheritance treaty, the
predecessor and successor states agree on future treaty rights and
obligations of the successor state under colonial treaties.40 Further, the
1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,41
to which Egypt and Ethiopia were parties, establishes that “[t]he
obligations or rights of a predecessor State under treaties in force . . . do
not become the obligations or rights of the successor State . . . .”42
33. See Wiebe, supra note 19, at 747.
34. Okoth-Owiro, supra note 17, at 16.
35. Id.
36. Carroll, supra note 17, at 278.
37. Tesfaye, supra note 17, at 72; Goitom Gebreluel, Ethiopia’s Grand
Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?, 37 WASH. Q.
25, 27 (2014); Mohamed S. Helal, Inheriting International Rivers: State
Succession to Territorial Obligations, South Sudan, and the 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 907, 941 (2013); Scott O. McKenzie, Note,
Egypt’s Choice: From the Nile Basin Treaty to the Cooperative Framework
Agreement, an International Legal Analysis, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 571, 587 (2012); Carroll, supra note 17, at 279.
38. See Tesfaye, supra note 17, at 72–73; Gebreluel, supra note 37, at 27;
Helal, supra note 37, at 941; McKenzie, supra note 37, at 587; Carroll, supra note
17, at 279.
39. See, e.g., Okoth-Owiro, supra note 17, at 12.
40. Id.
41. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug.
23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3, 17 I.L.M. 1488 [hereinafter VCSST].
42. Id. art. 8.
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Although no other states are parties to the treaty (Congo and Sudan are
mere signatories), the fact that Egypt signed and deposited the treaty
indicates its general willingness to disregard obligations and rights under
colonial treaties. Alternatively, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could be
invoked to provide states the possibility of terminating agreements after
far-reaching changes such as decolonization take effect.43 The Nileriparian states’ public statements indicating they do not feel bound to any
colonial Agreements could be regarded as such a termination.44
Overall, the majority of arguments oppose the binding effect of the
colonial treaties, especially concerning the sovereignty of the other
African states. The 1959 Agreement may be regarded as only binding upon
Sudan and Egypt, and not on other riparian states which did not partake in
the Agreement.45 The rights that the British received under the 1902
Agreement vis-à-vis Ethiopia may be seen as non-transferable to Egypt as
a new sovereign country, meaning Egypt cannot claim previously
Ethiopian obligations thereunder.
Therefore, without six ratifications of the CFA and without colonial
Agreements that bind all parties to the dispute, there is currently no
comprehensive regulatory framework on the Nile River Basin which could
be applied to evaluate the GERD’s lawfulness. However, the CFA is
expected to eventually enter into force, which would ultimately provide
for a comprehensive framework.
3. The 2015 Declaration of Principles Between Egypt, Sudan, and
Ethiopia
a. Emergence and Content of the Declaration
Since the CFA’s drafting, only one major agreement has come into
existence that alleviates the conflict over the GERD in recent years: the
2015 Declaration of Principles (“DoPs”).46 The Declaration contains

43. See Okoth-Owiro, supra note 17, at 19; Tekuya, supra note 8, at 12. The
doctrine is an acknowledged concept of customary international law. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
44. Okoth-Owiro, supra note 17, at 19.
45. See id. at 21, 34; see also Wiebe, supra note 19, at 747 (calling the 1959
Agreement “virtually useless”); cf. Carroll, supra note 17, at 281 (referring to the
legal status as “uncertain”).
46. Agreement on Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of
Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of the
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principles which are intended to govern the GERD’s erection. It attempts
to unite Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt’s contrasting viewpoints on the
lawfulness of the GERD. The DoPs concluded after lengthy tripartite
meetings between the ministers of those nations.47 The Declaration
consists of ten main principles, many of which resemble international
water law principles as reflected in the 1997 UN Convention on the Law
of Non-Navigational Uses of International Waterways,48 the major
international convention on watercourses, and the CFA. The DoPs include,
among others, the following principles: not to cause significant harm,49
equitable and reasonable utilization,50 cooperation on the first filling and
operation of the dam,51 and further principles targeting such filling and
operation.52 The DoPs explicitly recognize the notion of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the three states.53 Taking into account past legal
developments in the area, the DoPs can be regarded as a “landmark
development”54 as they provide the first agreement where Egypt expressly
acknowledged the equality of the riparian states55 and their respective
rights to build and operate dams on the river without subjection to alleged
historical obligations.
b. Legal Status of the Declaration
However, the DoPs’ legal status is disputed, and its principles have
not fully solved the conflict surrounding the GERD. The DoPs could be
regarded as soft or hard law, or as consisting partly of commitments and
partly of obligations.56 Soft law is law that does not immediately create

Sudan on on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, Mar. 23, 2015
[hereinafter DoPs].
47. See Salman, supra note 4, at 512–27, for an extensive overview of the
negotiation process.
48. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 2999 U.N.T.S. 52106 [hereinafter UN Watercourses
Convention].
49. DoPs, supra note 46, princ. III.
50. Id. princ. IV.
51. Id. princ. V.
52. See id. princ. II, VI–VIII.
53. Id. princ. IX.
54. Salman, supra note 4, at 522.
55. See DoPs, supra note 46, princ. IX.
56. See Tekuya, supra note 8, at 15–16; see also Tekuya, supra note 5, at 79–80.
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obligations and rights for the parties and is therefore non-binding, whereas
hard law is binding on the parties and legally enforceable.57
The fact that the three parties have subsequently signed an additional
document on the DoPs’ implementation which states the “sincere and full
commitment of the three countries to adhere to the Agreement on the
Declaration of Principles” speaks in favor of its bindingness.58 Contentwise, the frequent usage of the word “shall” with regard to actions also
supports the argument that the DoPs are binding.59
On the other hand, the name of the DoPs containing “Declarations” is
more often, but not exclusively,60 used for soft law.61 Further, an argument
against its bindingness could be made based on the fact that no formal
ratification, deposition, or entry into force is provided for in the
Agreement, as is generally the case with any binding agreement.62 Nor are
there any provisions regarding the possibility of reservations or means of
enforcement. The binding sources of international law, listed in Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”),63
merely refers to “international conventions, whether general or particular,”
with “conventions” meaning that the legal documents require some form
of formal adoption in line with international law.64 As this is not foreseen

57. See Hard Law/Soft Law, EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUMAN RIGHTS,
https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/hard-law-soft-law/ [https://perma.cc/WCQ6-G
F4G] (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
58. The 4th Tripartite Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign and Water Affairs
of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project
(GERDP), Dec. 27–28, 2015, https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/
regionaldocs/Khartoum_Document_29_Dec_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EJ7-86
P8] [hereinafter 2015 Khartoum Document]; see African River Basins, INT’L
WATER L. PROJECT, https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/africa
.html#Nile%20River%20Basin [https://perma.cc/NW24-SBKU] (last visited
Sept. 10, 2021); see also Tekuya, supra note 5, at 80–81.
59. See DoPs, supra note 46, princ. III–V, VII–IX; see also id. pmbl.
(mentioning that the three states have committed themselves to the principles).
60. See, e.g., Declaration of Panama, Oct. 4, 1995, [1995] PITSE 7.
61. See Tekuya, supra note 8, at 15–16; see also Tekuya, supra note 5, at 79–80.
62. Tekuya, supra note 5, at 79 (citing VCLT, supra note 43, art. 24(4)).
63. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
64. See id. art. 38(1)(a). Article 38(1)(a) of the ICJ Statute states that the
international conventions covered herein establish rules that are “expressly
recognized by the contesting states.” Id. (emphasis added).
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in the DoPs, the argument can be made ex negativo65 that the DoPs are
overall not hard law but instead are merely soft law. This argument is also
supported by the fact that Principle 5 foresees multiple future
agreements,66 which would qualify the DoPs as a more preliminary result
of negotiations.
Moving forward, the question surrounding the binding effect of the
DoPs does not need to be answered concerning accepted principles of
customary international law found therein, such as the principles of “no
significant harm” and of “equitable and reasonable utilization,” as these
per se constitute international law.67
On the other hand, the specific framework surrounding the GERD,
such as the principles on the first filling and operating of the dam that
deviate from customary international law or that go into more detail, could
merely constitute soft law.68 Procedural duties hereunder and potential
breaches thereof are nevertheless examined in the Section on procedural
duties, as there is no clear answer to whether the DoPs are legally binding.
B. International Water Law
This Section provides a brief overview of the current “playing field”
of international water law beyond the Nile River Basin. This Section also
covers the formation of customary international law and major multilateral
environmental agreements.
1. The Formation of Customary International Water Law
With 263 transboundary lake and river basins69 on the one hand and
growing populations, agriculture, and industrialization on the other hand,

65. Angelika Nußberger, Hard Law or Soft Law—Does it Matter?, in THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW 43 (Anne van Aaken & Iulia Motoc eds., 2018).
66. According to DoPs, supra note 46, princ. V (“The three countries . . . will
utilize the final outcomes of the joint studies . . . to . . . [a]gree on guidelines and
rules on the first filling of GERD which shall cover all different scenarios, in
parallel with the construction of GERD. . . . [and] [a]gree on guidelines and rules
for the annual operation of GERD . . . .”).
67. See ICJ Statute, supra note 63, art. 38(1)(b) (stating the court shall apply
“international custom”). See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b for a validation of the
question whether these principles constitute customary international law.
68. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.b.
69. International Decade for Action ‘Water for Life’ 2005-2015, UNITED
NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.un.org/waterforlife
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the demand for freshwater resources has naturally increased while the
global supply has remained the same. Thus, disputes over water allocation
continue to increase.
a. Uniting Opposing Viewpoints of Upstream and Downstream
States
Naturally, upstream and downstream riparian states’ interests are
“fundamentally opposed.”70 This has subsequently led to different legal
theories—that can and have been successfully invoked in the past—that
will benefit either the upstream or downstream nation, resulting in a
deadlock unless middle ground is established. Upstream states rely on
“absolute territorial sovereignty,” also referred to as the Harmon
Doctrine,71 which provides for an unlimited sovereign right to use all the
resources within their territory. Downstream states, on the other hand,
favor the “absolute integrity of the watercourse,” where upstream states
“can do nothing that affects the quantity or quality of water that flows
down the watercourse.”72
b. Major Principles in Today’s Customary International Law
Over the years, a middle ground has evolved, granting every state the
right to “equitable utilization” of the water without imposing “significant
transboundary harm” upon any other riparian state.73 The duty to avoid the
imposition of significant transboundary harm is a major principle in
international environmental law and is not limited to only water resources
as established and reaffirmed in various decisions and sources, such as the

decade/transboundary_waters.shtml [https://perma.cc/R9PA-XMAS] (last updated
Oct. 23, 2014).
70. See Carel Dieperink, Successful International Cooperation in the Rhine
Catchment Area, 25 WATER INT’L 347, 349 (2000); Attila M. Tanzi, The InterRelationship Between No Harm, Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation and
Cooperation Under International Water Law, 20 INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS:
POL., L. & ECON. 619 (2020).
71. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules on Water Resources: A New
Paradigm for International Water Law, IWRA WORLD WATER CONG. PROC. 1
(2008); Tuomas Kuokkanen, Water Security and International Law, 20
POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 6 (2017).
72. Dellapenna, supra note 71, at 2.
73. Id.; see e.g., UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48, arts. 5, 7;
Berlin Rules on Water Resources, infra note 95, arts. 12, 16; CFA, supra note 28,
art. 3(4), (5); see also DoPs, supra note 46, princ. 3–4.
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Trail Smelter Case,74 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,75 the
Lake Lanoux Case,76 the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case,77 the Iron Rhine
Railway Case,78 the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay Case,79 and the
Nicaragua v. Costa Rica Case.80
Riparian states are currently regarded as forming a “community of
interest”81 that “becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential
features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the user
of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential
privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others.”82 Notably,
today’s international water law does not provide every riparian state an
equal share of water but instead sets out factors—varying between
different legal documents—which can be used to determine what
constitutes an amount sufficient for “equitable utilization.”
During the negotiations on the CFA between Nile-riparian countries,
the principle of “water security” was developed to further clarify the
respective rights of upstream and downstream countries and unite Egypt
and Sudan’s opposing viewpoints vis-à-vis the other riparian countries.
Egypt and Sudan wanted the CFA to explicitly recognize their rights under
“existing agreements” from colonial and early post-colonial times, a
demand not met favorably by the other Nile-riparian states during

74. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
75. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1. See Alexandre Kiss, The International
Protection of the Environment, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE, AND THEORY
(Ronald St. J. MacDonald and Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983), for a discussion
of the principle.
76. Lake Lanoux Arb., supra note 27.
77. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7
(Sept. 25).
78. Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005).
79. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶ 101 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills Case].
80. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa
Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan
River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665 (Dec. 16) [hereinafter
Nicaragua v. Costa Rica Case].
81. Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Commission of the River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 27
(Sept. 10).
82. Id.
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negotiations.83 However, the concept of water security has not yet been
expressly acknowledged as a principle of international customary law84
and (given the fact that in the absence of water security there is an
imminent threat of significant harm) is not essential to the discussion of
water rights as it is already encompassed within the existing international
legal framework.
2. Relevant International Agreements
In addition to customary international law (which evolves as a
consequence of arbitration, court decisions, states’ treaties, actual practice,
and opinio juris),85 a plethora of international agreements exist that could
potentially be relevant in determining whether the GERD violates
international law. The most important agreements and their implications
are summarized in the following sections of this Article.
a. United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses
of International Waterways of 1997
At the international level, potentially the main applicable instrument
is the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention,86 a framework convention
which, inter alia, sets out the two principles of “[e]quitable and reasonable
utilization and participation” of waterways87 and an “[o]bligation not to
cause significant harm.”88 When these two principles conflict, the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization prevails.89
In order to immediately apply to the GERD, the Nile-riparian states
need to be parties to the Convention, which is currently not the case. Most
Nile-riparian countries initially abstained from voting or voted against the

83. See Mahemud Eshtu Tekuya, Governing the Nile Under Climatic
Uncertainty: The Need for a Climate-Proof Basin-Wide Treaty, 59 NAT. RES. J.
321, 332 (2019).
84. Kuokkanen, supra note 71, at 16 (referring to water security’s emergence
as “a new notion” in international law that has always been present in international
water law, but “not necessarily labelled as water security rules”).
85. Opinio juris et necessitatis means a “sense of legal obligation” or a
practice that is “accepted as law” by states. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (7th ed. 2008), referring, inter alia, to the wording
of the ICJ Statute.
86. See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48.
87. Id. art. 5.
88. Id. art. 7.
89. See id.
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UN’s Convention.90 However, as mentioned above, these principles are
now considered to be customary international law and have expressly been
acknowledged by the Nile-riparian states,91 meaning they are nevertheless
relevant in the regional context.
b. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes of 1992
Another potentially relevant Convention is the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (“UNECE”) Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes (“UN Water Convention”).92 It mandates the parties to “take all
appropriate measures . . . [t]o ensure that transboundary waters are used in
a reasonable and equitable way, taking into particular account their
transboundary character, in the case of activities which cause or are likely
to cause transboundary impact.”93 Therefore, the UN Water Convention
reiterates the principles already mentioned above but does not bind any of
the Nile-riparian countries.
c. Berlin Rules of 2004
In addition to the UN, another relevant player in the development of
international water law is the International Law Association (“ILA”).
Following the ILA’s 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International
River Waters,94 the Berlin Rules on Water Resources95 were adopted in
2004 to supersede prior ILA rules and provide an overview of current
customary international law applicable to a broader spectrum of covered
90. Only Kenya and Sudan voted in favor. See Gabriel Eckstein, The Status
of the UN Watercourses Convention: Does it Still Hold Water?, 36 INT’L J.
WATER RES. Dev. 429, 442–43 (2020).
91. See, e.g., the DoPs and the letters of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia to the UN
Security Council.
92. See U.N. Econ. Comm. Eur., Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, March 17, 1992, 1936
U.N.T.S. 269 [hereinafter UN Water Convention].
93. Id. art. 2(2).
94. Int. L. Assoc., Rep. of the Fifty-Second Conf., The Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Rep. of the Conference in Helsinki,
1966).
95. Int. L. Assoc., Rep. of the Seventy-First Conf., The Berlin Rules on Water
Resources (Rep. of the Conference in Berlin, 2004) [hereinafter Berlin Rules on
Water Resources].
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freshwater resources.96 The Berlin Rules do not constitute binding
international law but instead are a summary of applicable rules. The Berlin
Rules mention the rules of cooperation,97 equitable utilization,98 and
avoidance of transboundary harm.99 The rules mandate a procedural
obligation to assess environmental impacts of programs, projects, and
activities100 and lay out the duties of international cooperation and
administration, including the duties of exchange of information,
notification, and consultation.101 While they are not inherently binding on
states, they codify international arbitration law, court decisions, and other
sources and therefore can be seen as an additional approval of the
principles central in the GERD dispute.
3. Procedural Obligations Under International Water Law
In international water law, a distinction can be drawn between the
procedural and the above-mentioned substantive obligations. This
distinction is especially helpful when analyzing potential breaches
regarding the GERD’s filling and future operation. Procedural obligations
arise from the states’ entitlement to be protected against significant
transboundary harm102 and aim to ensure that there will not be a breach of
substantive obligations.
a. Duty to Assess, Notify, and Consult
An analysis of treaties demonstrates that obligations to “assess, notify,
and consult” are present in international law if there is a significant risk

96. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 71; Salman M. A. Salman, The
Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules:
Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 WATER RES. DEV. 625, 625–40
(2007).
97. Berlin Rules on Water Resources, supra note 95, art. 11.
98. Id. art. 12; see also id. art. 13 (providing a determination of equitable and
reasonable use).
99. Id. art. 16.
100. Id. arts. 29–31.
101. Id. arts. 56–59.
102. See Günther Handl, Transboundary Impacts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 540–42 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée
& Ellen Hey eds., 2007); Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in
International Environmental Law, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275 (1996);
Developments in the Law – International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1484, 1511–20 (1991).
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that a proposed action may impose transboundary harm on another state.103
For example, such obligations are located in Principles 17–19 of the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Although a nonbinding legal document, the Rio Declaration is useful to examine.104
Procedural duties are mentioned in Articles 7–9 of the ILC’s draft Articles
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,105
Articles 11–19 of the UN Watercourses Convention, and Articles 4, 6–8
of the Aarhus Convention.106
Assessing potential harm to other states includes the undertaking of an
environmental impact assessment where an evaluation is conducted on
whether “there is a risk that the proposed . . . activity may have a
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a
shared resource.”107 However, the exact content of such an environmental
impact assessment can be determined by each state within its respective
legislation as long as it acts with due diligence.108 The duty to notify the
(potentially) affected party will often be found in a more specific
agreement109 and is a necessary step to “consult in order to assess the risks
of the plan and to negotiate possible changes which may eliminate those
risks or minimize their effects.”110 Consultation is further recognized in
various multilateral environmental agreements such as Articles 3(7) and 5
of the Espoo Convention, which underlines its importance in international
law.111 Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are not parties to any of the binding
Agreements mentioned above delineating such procedural duties.
However, since the duties are extensively mentioned in multilateral
environmental agreements, they can be regarded as part of customary

103. See Okowa, supra note 102, at 277–78.
104. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 169 (2d Cir. 2003)
(explaining “neither of these declarations created enforceable legal obligations”).
105. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at 157–61 (2001).
106. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm. Eur., Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447.
107. Pulp Mills Case, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20)
(emphasis added).
108. Id. ¶ 205.
109. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 123–30 (discussing a 1975 agreement between Uruguay
and Argentina).
110. Id. ¶ 115 (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm. Eur., Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment, International Legal Materials, February 25,
1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309; cf. Okowa, supra note 102, at 277 n.5.
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international law. As such, they also need to be complied with by countries
that are not parties to the Conventions mentioned above.
b. Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith
Further, a duty to negotiate in good faith was established in multiple
proceedings when a state acts in a way potentially affecting an
international watercourse.112 Good faith means a state’s action “must not
be mere formalities,” but instead genuinely aims at reconciling interests
potentially adversely affected.113 In the Lake Lanoux case,114 for example,
the Spanish government feared that French works on the lake may
adversely affect Spanish interests. Spain took the view that the May 26,
1866 Treaty of Bayonne between France and Spain obliged France to
subject such works to a prior agreement with the Spanish government.
While the necessity of such an agreement was denied, the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held that the party carrying out the works must
provide the other party with sufficient information necessary to decide
whether the other state’s interests will be affected and then negotiate in
good faith.115
III. POTENTIAL BREACHES OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
OBLIGATIONS DUE TO THE ERECTION AND FUTURE OPERATION OF THE
GERD
Having carved out the main procedural and substantive obligations
under international water law, which are arguably applicable to the filling
and operation of the GERD, Part III will analyze whether Ethiopia, by
filling and planning to operate the GERD, has breached any such
obligations.
A. Procedural Obligation Under the 1902 Colonial Treaty to Obtain
Prior Agreement
Although it remains undetermined whether the 1902 Treaty still
imposes a duty on Ethiopia to obtain an agreement from Egypt and Sudan,
the latter as the successor of the British, before undertaking actions

112. See generally Pulp Mills Case, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14; see also Lake Lanoux
Arb., supra note 27.
113. Lake Lanoux Arb., supra note 27.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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perceived to “arrest[] the Nile waters,”116 that question is not relevant if
either of the following are true: the GERD does not de facto “arrest the
waters” or if Egypt and Sudan approved the GERD.
From the wording of the 1902 Treaty, the treaty is arguably only
applicable in situations where the Nile water is fully “arrested,” implying
that Egypt and Sudan do not receive any share of the Nile waters.
However, interpreting the treaty from its telos,117 a reading of the
ambiguous language is not convincing as it would be technically absurd to
arrest all of the Nile waters or redirect the waters to areas outside of Sudan
and Egypt. Instead, the 1902 Treaty can be read to apply to larger projects
erected on the Nile or its tributaries, meaning the GERD would be subject
to it.
However, the question becomes irrelevant if Egypt and Sudan gave
their approval to the GERD. Such an approval can be implied by the 2015
DoPs, all of which presuppose that the GERD could be built and only
details surrounding the filling and operation needed to be discussed. The
DoPs expressly contain an agreement that Ethiopia may “arrest the waters”
of the Blue Nile to advance the GERD, and thus Ethiopia should not be
viewed as breaching any duties under the 1902 Treaty.
B. Procedural Obligations Under the 2015 Declaration of Principles and
Customary International Law
The above-mentioned obligations to assess, notify, and consult are
mirrored in the DoPs, which is why it is first evaluated whether Ethiopia’s
conduct constitutes a breach of its obligations under the DoPs. According
to Principle 5 of the 2015 DoPs, Ethiopia is obliged “[t]o implement the
recommendations of the International Panel of Experts (IPoE), [and to]
respect the final outcomes of the Technical National Committee (TNC) on
the joint studies recommended in the IPOE Final Report throughout the
different phases of the project.”118 Based on the “final outcomes of the
joint studies,” the three countries are expected to “[a]gree on guidelines
and rules on the first filling of GERD”119 and for its “annual operation . . .
which the owner of the dam may adjust from time to time.”120 Further, the
DoPs expect the providence of “data and information needed for the
conduct of the TNC joint studies in good faith and in a timely manner.”121
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
Meaning from its purpose.
DoPs, supra note 46, princ. V.
Id. princ. V, para. 2(a).
Id. princ. V, para. 2(b).
Id. princ. VII.
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These requirements mirror the assessment of potential impacts on
downstream states, notification regarding such impacts, and subsequent
consultation in the form of agreements.
Regarding the operation of the dam, the DoPs provide for “inform[ing]
the downstream countries of any unforeseen or urgent circumstances
requiring adjustments in the operation of GERD”122 and for “sustain[ed]
cooperation and coordination on the annual operation of GERD with
downstream reservoirs . . . through the . . . ministries responsible for
water.”123 An appropriate coordination mechanism is to be set up for this.
Principle 5 provides for a timeframe of 15 months to conduct the processes
mentioned.
1. Compliance with Procedural Obligations and the “Current
Stand”
It must be addressed whether Ethiopia has complied with the
procedural duties imposed through Principles 5 and 7. The final report of
the IPoE, published on May 31, 2013,124 contains recommendations such
as conducting joint studies of the three countries through the TNC.
However, the studies were never initiated as the three countries disagreed
on a baseline for modeling, which can be broken down to disagreements
over the validity of rights under the colonial Agreements.125 Negotiations
over these studies and (by now) the filling and annual operation of the
GERD have continued for years with input from various international actors
such as the United States (“U.S.”), the World Bank, and most recently the
United Nations Security Council and the African Union (“AU”).126 As of
July 2021, the three countries have resumed negotiations under the auspices
of the AU with the idea of finding an “African solution . . . to African
problems.”127 Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council held a
meeting on the dam requested by Sudan and Egypt because, in their opinion,

122. Id. princ. V, para. 3(c).
123. Id. princ. V.
124. Int’l Panel of Experts [IPoE] on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Project (GERDP), Final Report 18–19, 39–42 (2013) [hereinafter IPoE Report].
125. Tekuya, supra note 5, at 84–86.
126. For a detailed description of the different stages of negotiation and their
legal relevance, see generally Tekuya, supra note 5, at 86–101.
127. Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan Should
Negotiate Mutually Beneficial Agreement over Management of Nile Waters, Top
Official Tells Security Council, U.N. Meetings Coverage SC/14576, (July 8,
2021).
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the filling of the dam poses a threat to international peace and security.128
At the same time, the reservoir behind the dam has already been filled
twice during past rainy seasons, with the “second filling” completed,129
making the dam a fait accompli and close to being operational. If the
procedural obligations imposed under the DoPs are regarded as absolute,
Ethiopia could be in breach by not conducting joint studies with Egypt and
Sudan and initiating the filling of the dam without a subsequent agreement.
2. Performance of Procedural Duties in Good Faith
However, under Article 26 of the VCLT and Principle 1 of the DoPs,
states must only perform duties arising from treaties binding upon them
“in good faith.” This demonstrates that the procedural duties cannot be
seen as absolute: determination of a breach must be considered in light of
Ethiopia’s due diligence and degree of fault. Thus, the question arises as
to whether Ethiopia has breached its duty to act in good faith regarding the
filling of the GERD despite not being able to garner the other countries’
agreement on the precise manner in which the studies were to be
conducted. Given the lengthy attempts to come to an agreement, with
negotiations spanning nearly a decade, the establishment of the IPoE, and
the general willingness of Ethiopia to exchange data and information with
the downstream countries in the future, it could be argued that Ethiopia
exercised good faith in attempting to fulfill its procedural obligations. The
author Tekuya concludes that “requiring a preliminary agreement for
filling and testing the GERD goes beyond the requirements of
international law governing transboundary watercourses.”130 However,
Ethiopia explicitly affirmed in Principle 5 of the DoPs that such an
agreement should be reached. Therefore, the underlying question turns to
whether reaching an agreement can actually constitute a breach of a
procedural duty if performance of such a duty necessarily involves other
actors. On the one hand, Ethiopia could be viewed as failing to exercise
due diligence with its unsuccessful attempts at reaching agreements with
Sudan and Egypt. After the U.S. Department of Treasury intervened, an
agreement that Egypt and Sudan would have favored was drafted by the

128. Id.
129. Ethiopia Says Second Filling of Renaissance Dam Complete, AL
JAZEERA (July 19, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/19/ethiopiasays-second-filling-of-renaissance-dam-complete [https://perma.cc/MKT6-BCV7].
130. Tekuya, supra note 5, at 99–100.
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Department and the World Bank.131 Ethiopia refused to enter,132 as the
country did not view the proposal as suitable because the draft was not
prepared by the three countries pursuant to the DoPs.133 Notably, Ethiopia
also opposed the suggested agreement because its sovereign rights would
have been diminished; the GERD would have been disadvantaged as
opposed to other dams on the Nile (such as the Aswan Dam), and the draft
would have granted the other states a great deal of influence regarding its
operation.134 Given the significance of these concessions, the fact that
Ethiopia refrained from entering into this agreement as a breach of its
duties is not very convincing. Otherwise, the other states would have a
veto power on whether Ethiopia is in breach (for instance, by never
agreeing to anything proposed or dragging negotiations on indefinitely).
Therefore, by keeping up negotiations in good faith on the filing and
annual operation, Ethiopia fulfilled its duties under Principle 5 of the
DoPs.
Although Ethiopia maintained good faith negotiations, an argument
exists that the country should have refrained from filling the dam reservoir
altogether. From their language, the DoPs do not impose such a duty
explicitly. Thus, the duty can only be derived implicitly, which is not
sufficient to constitute a breach of duties under the DoPs (especially, as in
this case, where the other states would again have veto power to
permanently keep Ethiopia from ever filling its dam, thereby violating
Ethiopia’s sovereign rights).135 This does not mean Ethiopia may not be in
substantial breach because of the filling and future operations, but
regarding procedural duties, even if the DoPs are regarded as binding law,
Ethiopia is not breaching them. The same can be said for the “underlying”
procedural duties to assess, notify, and consult in international law, as
Ethiopia conducted an environmental, social, and transboundary
environmental impact assessment136 and continuously communicated with
the other two nations.
131. Statement by the Treasury on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Feb. 28, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/
secretary-statements-remarks/statement-by-the-secretary-of-the-treasury-on-thegrand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam [https://perma.cc/G53C-BMPS].
132. Press Release, Embassy of Eth., London, Statement of Ethiopia on the
Negotiations on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Feb. 29, 2020).
133. Id.
134. See Tekuya, supra note 5, at 95–100.
135. See Lake Lanoux Arb., supra note 27, at 14, for the argument of an adverse
veto power in a similar situation. See also Tekuya, supra note 5, at 96–97.
136. IPoE Report, supra note 124, at 18–19, 39–42; Tekuya, supra note 5, at
99.
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C. Substantive Obligations
Following the discussion of breaches of procedural duties, a
discussion follows as to whether Ethiopia breached any substantive
obligations under applicable laws. At the core of the substantive discussion
is whether the filling and operation of the GERD may result in significant
harm for the downstream countries, especially Egypt and Sudan, and
whether Ethiopia’s conduct is covered by the principle of reasonable and
equitable utilization. The relevant documents137 all set out rules on how
the two major principles interrelate and also what constitutes reasonable
and equitable utilization.
1. Applicable Legal Standard
Whether Ethiopia breached any substantive obligations must be
considered against the background of a relevant legal standard in the
present case. To determine this standard, the 2015 DoPs, the UN
Watercourses Convention, the UN Water Convention, and the Berlin
Rules on Water Resources seem applicable. These authorities are all
framed similarly but vary in detail, especially regarding the factors for
determining reasonable and equitable use. Using the 2015 DoPs would be
advantageous as the document is specifically tailored to the Nile, whereas
the UN Conventions and the Berlin Rules have a broader application.
However, the UN Watercourses Convention codifies customary
international law138 and constitutes a binding legal instrument (although
not directly binding to the Nile-riparian countries) that goes into more
detail than the UN Water Convention. It might be more persuasive to a
court or arbitral committee should this case ever be submitted for litigation
or arbitration. Therefore, it is logical to primarily refer to the UN
Watercourses Convention.
2. Reasonable and Equitable Utilization vs. No Significant Harm
The interrelationship between the two principles of reasonable and
equitable utilization and no significant harm has been assessed differently
137. Meaning the DoPs, the UN Watercourses Convention, the UN Water
Convention, and the Berlin Rules on Water Resources.
138. Ariel Litke & Alistair Rieu-Clarke, The UN Watercourses Convention: A
Milestone in the History of International Water Law, GLOB. WATER F. (Feb. 2,
2015), https://globalwaterforum.org/2015/02/02/the-un-watercourses-conventiona-milestone-in-the-history-of-international-water-law/ [https://perma.cc/3KP5-AM
GF].
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in legal practice and literature.139 According to the language of Article 7(2)
of the UN Watercourses Convention, the Convention does not prohibit the
imposition of significant harm altogether; rather, a balance must be found
between the upstream and downstream states’ competing interests. If a use
causes such harm, all the appropriate measures must be taken to eliminate
or mitigate such harm,140 which endorses the ultimate prevalence of the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.141 Thus, a breach occurs
if a state “causes significant harm, without properly balancing all the
equitable utilization factors.”142
3. Factors Laid Out in Article 6 of the UN Watercourses Convention
Article 6 of the UN Watercourses Convention provides that equitable
and reasonable utilization “requires taking into account all relevant factors
and circumstances” and provides a non-exhaustive list of factors, which
this subsection will now assess in the local context surrounding the GERD.
First, various factors “of a natural character” are mentioned.143 On one
hand, with their dry climates and little access to freshwater, Egypt and
Sudan’s geographic circumstances144 are favorable to their position.
However, if one considers that Ethiopia provides the majority of the Nile’s
water, a hydrographic or hydrological argument in its favor could be made,
and from an equity perspective, Ethiopia should benefit from the
advantages such water resources pose.145 Therefore, the above-mentioned
factor “of a natural character” is rather favorable to Ethiopia’s planned use
of the river.
Next, the social and economic needs of the riparian states must be
taken into account.146 Historically, Ethiopia has been an extremely
impoverished country. However, it has seen significant economic

139. See Eckstein, supra note 90, at 434–43; Tanzi, supra note 70; Stoa, supra
note 24, at 1327–29.
140. See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48, art. 7(2).
141. Other authors argue that one principle is inherent in the other and neglect
a “hierarchy.” See, e.g., Tanzi, supra note 70, at 622.
142. Id.
143. UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48, art. 6(1)(a).
144. See Tekuya, supra note 83, at 334.
145. Explicitly including the contributing amount of water as one of the factors
in Article 6 of the UN Watercourses Convention was suggested, but not
implemented. Carroll, supra note 17, at 288.
146. See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48, art. 6(1)(b).
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improvements in recent years, and its GDP has grown considerably,147
although its GDP is still significantly lower than Egypt’s.148 Further,
roughly 55% of Ethiopia’s population still has no access to electricity,149
a fact that could change significantly once the GERD is in place and grid
systems transport the created energy. The social and economic needs of
Ethiopians are favorable to Ethiopia’s position. Moreover, the population
dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse state must be
considered.150 While Ethiopia has vast water resources, Egypt’s rising
population, forecasted to reach 115 million by 2050 and located in an area
95% desert,151 is heavily dependent on the Nile River. This factor is thus
favorable to Egypt. Further, the effects of its use on other riparian states
must be considered.152 This is a heavily disputed issue, with Ethiopia
arguing that the hydropower dam may actually improve water
management on the river by preventing floods and improving forecasting
options.153 Egypt, on the other hand, warns about catastrophic
consequences such as increased droughts, higher salinity of the lower Nile
due to low water levels, and corresponding adverse effects on agriculture
and general living conditions.154 The effects also depend upon the manner
in which the filling and operation is conducted and whether there will be
adequate cooperation and communication tools to effectively manage the
water with the downstream nations, especially Sudan. Therefore, this
factor is not favorable for either country.
Furthermore, existing and potential uses need to be considered.155
Egypt has heavily relied on past usage and agreements dating back to
colonial and early post-colonial times, which are more in its favor.156
147. The numbers of Ethiopia’s GDP growth vary between 7% and 11%. See
Gebreluel, supra note 37, at 29.
148. Carroll, supra note 17, at 292.
149. See Ethiopia Energy Outlook: Analysis from Africa Energy Outlook
2019, IEA (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.iea.org/articles/ethiopia-energy-outlook
[https://perma.cc/C4E7-JRWZ].
150. See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48, art. 6(1)(c).
151. See Tesfaye, supra note 17, at 68.
152. See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48, art. 6(1)(d).
153. John Mukum Mbaku, The Controversy over the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam, BROOKINGS (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissancedam/ [https://perma.cc/5FP6-EP6K].
154. ‘Means Our Death’: Egyptian Farmers Fear Effect of Ethiopia Dam, AL
JAZEERA (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/20/meansour-death-egyptian-farmers-fear-effect-of-ethiopia-dam.
155. UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 48, art. 6(1)(e).
156. Carroll, supra note 17, at 288.
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While it is true that Egypt has had more uses in the past, the Convention’s
aim is not to provide for a rigid system that cements past power dynamics
but rather to balance the already existing rights and usages against
potential ones. With Ethiopia’s rising economy and demands, along with
the fact that it has benefited significantly less from the opportunities the
Nile provides when compared to Egypt and the Aswan Dam, the notion
that the law would prevent Ethiopia from taking advantage of the potential
utility provided by the Nile, as it has currently done with the GERD, is not
plausible. Hence, this factor can also be regarded as even between the two
countries. Article 6(1)(f) of the UN Watercourses Convention demands for
conservation, protection, development, and economy of use of the
watercourse’s water resources and the costs of measures taken to that
effect to be factored. The GERD will forward the human-driven
development of the Nile, but the project could also pose considerable risks
regarding the conservation and protection of the river.157 With decreases
of water levels forecasted and increased risks of droughts as a consequence
of climate change,158 this factor is not favorable to Ethiopia, or it at least
evens out the states’ interests.
Lastly, the availability of alternatives with comparable value to the use
must be considered according to Article 6(1)(g) UN Watercourses
Convention. This aspect entered the Convention as a consequence of a
similarly worded draft proposal by Egypt.159 Comparatively valued
alternatives for Ethiopia would attempt to find other clean energy sources
to improve electricity access in their country, to build multiple smaller
dams, or to import electricity from neighboring countries. However, from
today’s perspective, especially with the construction of the GERD nearly
completed, these arguments do not seem convincing. This “availability of
alternatives” factor is also not favorable for Ethiopia as long as the country
cooperates with the downstream countries on the filling and operation of
the hydropower dam. Therefore, the overall majority of arguments seem
favorable for Ethiopia and for the lawfulness of the project.
157. The IPoE Report, supra note 124, at 18–19, 39–42, found that more indepth studies were needed to clearly assess potential environmental impacts on
Ethiopia and the downstream countries.
158. See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION CAPACITIES IN THE NILE RIVER BASIN 13 (2015); see also UNESCO
WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2020: WATER AND CLIMATE CHANGE 29 (2020) (citing
Mohamed E. Elshamy, Mohamed A.-A. Sayed, Bakr Badawy, Impacts of Climate
Change on the Nile Flows at Dongola Using Statistical Downscaled GCM
Scenarios, 2 NILE BASIN WATER ENG’G SCI. MAG. 1 (2009)).
159. Carroll, supra note 17, at 288.

2022]

THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM

61

4. Preventing Significant Harm Moving Forward
This finding, however, does not mean that Ethiopia does not need to
continue to cooperate with the other countries and exercise due
diligence160 in preventing transboundary harm moving forward. De
minimis impacts on Egypt or other downstream countries will not suffice
for such a finding;161 rather, the impacts need to be “significant.”
Generally, a significant harm or threat has been denied by the International
Panel of Experts with experts from Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia in its final
report on the project.162
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article provides a general overview of international law
potentially applicable to the GERD dispute and analyzes the procedural
and substantive implications arising therefrom. It has been established that
currently, the lengthy ongoing negotiations regarding the filling and
operation of the dam next to the continued filling of the dam are not in
violation of international law, nor is the future operation of the dam, as
long as Ethiopia continues negotiating with the other states and exercises
due diligence in preventing significant transboundary harm. Hopefully, the
dispute, which by now has lasted a decade, can eventually become a
solution satisfying all parties. Moving forward and looking beyond the
current dispute on the GERD, the CFA’s ratification and the establishment
of a regional instrument to govern future disputes around the Nile River
can be viewed as essential in determining the future legality of projects on
this vital resource.

160. For the standard of due diligence, see Pulp Mills Case, 2010 I.C.J. Rep.
14, ¶¶ 64–65; Günther Handl, Trail Smelter in Contemporary International Law:
Application to Nuclear Energy, TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 132 (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
161. Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 192 (Dec. 16).
162. See Tekuya, supra note 5, at 83 n.97; see also Stoa, supra note 24, 1364–
65 n.222. It should, however, be taken into account that the IPoE Report states in
many places that its authors are lacking in-depth information and want further
studies to be conducted. See IPoE Report, supra note 124.

